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THE PATTERNS AND IMPACTS OF TURKISH 
IMMIGRATION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION
ELIE KATZENSON
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY
Abstract
Since the early 1960s, Turkish nationals have immigrated to the European Union in 
large numbers. Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium have the highest Turkish popu-
lations in the European Union and have managed differing models of incorporation. A 
number of motivating factors have contributed to the unflagging numbers of Turks such 
as the implementation of guest-worker programs, the reunification of families, and micro-
structures within migratory chains. Though the likelihood of Turkey gaining membership 
to the European Union has dimmed as of late, the mere possibility of its joining warrants 
the analysis of Turkish immigration to the EU, as it could shed light on the social and eco-
nomic changes that could occur with Turkish membership to the EU. This analytical paper 
will detail the impacts of the varying methods of incorporation employed by the receiving 
countries and examine the historical patterns and impacts of Turkish immigration in the 
European Union.
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Introduction
 Since the end of World War II, Turkey has been one of the largest providers of labor 
migration and undocumented migration to Europe. Comprising a tri-border region are 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium, nations that encouraged, accepted, and shouldered 
their roles as receiving countries of Turkish immigrants and guest workers at various points 
in time. Germany’s “bilateral labor recruitment agreements” with Turkey in the early 1960s 
started a pattern of temporary immigration of guest workers that later morphed into a pat-
tern of permanent immigration of guest workers (Sari, 2003, 1). While guest workers came 
to define the sending and receiving relationship between Turkey and Germany, other vari-
eties of Turkish immigrants such as asylees and undocumented persons constitute the high 
numbers of Turkish nationals in this tri-border region. 
 In this essay, I will examine the push and pull factors of Turkish immigration to the 
European Union, looking at the circumstances in Turkey over the second half of the twen-
tieth century that motivated Turks to traverse continents. Additionally, I will detail and 
compare the models of incorporation employed by Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. 
Because the majority of academic literature on Turkish immigration in Europe focuses on 
Germany specifically, my focus will also weigh disproportionately towards Germany. With 
a thorough comparison of these incorporation models, I aim to identify the most successful 
integration strategies and hypothesize potential integration-policy approaches for the future. 
Over the past few years, the possibility of Turkey gaining membership to the European 
Union has appeared to diminish. Between the EU officials who claim that Turkey cannot 
meet the membership criteria and an increasingly conservative Turkish government, the 
once dizzyingly possibility seems rather distant. I will briefly look at how Turkey might 
become a more attractive candidate for membership and how immigration patterns could 
evolve if that were the case. 
Driving Forces of Immigration
 After World War II, Europe entered a period of “postwar economic expansion” in 
which a variety of low-skilled jobs proliferated and the consistent availability of workers be-
came a necessity (Sari, 2003, 6). The creation of guest-worker programs provided legal em-
ployment for an easy flow of workers who could withstand “seasonal or temporary charac-
teristics of the job” (Sari, 2003, 3). Leaving Turkey to be a migrant worker in Europe meant 
low wages, loneliness, unattractive working conditions, and the near-guaranteed potential 
for overt discrimination. Native citizens of the receiving countries considered Turkish guest 
workers to be members of the lowest class in society. Despite the obvious hardships of im-
migrating, migrant workers remained undeterred from their goal of coming to work and 
live in Europe. This is because despite their low socioeconomic status as workers in Euro-
pean countries, Turkish workers from abroad experienced upward mobility back in Turkey, 
“being among the wealthiest in their communities, with their children hav(ing) much better 
educational opportunities than they did” (Sari, 2003, 14). In the 1960s and '70s, residents 
in Turkish urban areas experienced job, housing, and service shortages, which increasingly 
drove them to seek employment opportunities in Western Europe. 
 In their initial stages, the guest-worker programs sought to bring over workers for a 
period of one to two years after which a new round of workers would come. Both Turkish 
and European officials believed that this system would allow workers to benefit economical-
ly without major changes to the national status quo. Turkey would receive remittances from 
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their citizens working overseas and receiving countries such as those in the Tri-Border re-
gion could avoid the complications of integrating the Turks and creating overarching social-
support systems. Despite the timed residency permits for guest workers, receiving countries 
began to notice that the recruited laborers were not leaving after their permits expired. In 
1973, the German government ended their guest-worker program and started to offer im-
migrant laborers incentives in exchange for returning home (Mueller, 2006, 426). Despite 
the ban on labor recruitment, the number of Turks living in Europe continued to rise due 
to family reunification policies and employers who did not want to send their guest workers 
home after paying recruitment, transportation, and training fees, and integrating them into 
the workplace (Martin, 1991, 40). Acknowledging the growing numbers of Turkish work-
ers that remained after the terminus of their work permits, new agreements arose that led to 
the establishment of “councils and ombudsmen for migrant affairs that deal with bilingual 
education, school busing, remedial employment programs, and affirmative action policies” 
(Martin, 1991, 41) by all six original members of the European Union (France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg). These programs were created with the hope 
of incorporating a potentially troubled population that many Europeans deemed a looming 
threat.
Turkish Immigration to Germany
 Germany has the highest population of Turkish immigrants in Europe with three mil-
lion residents having at least one Turkish parent, according to a January 2015 BBC News 
report. Turks came to Germany through guest-worker programs in the 1960s and '70s 
before a second period of immigration began, driven by the reunification of families which 
greatly heightened the number of Turks in the country. The “third and current phase is 
characterized by German-born members among Turkish families” as well as “the importing 
of spouses by young Turks from rural areas in Turkey because Turkish women from local 
German communities are considered to be too Western” (Mueller, 2006, 420). For the past 
45 years, Germany has employed a segregationist model of incorporation for immigrants. 
This model is characterized by a limiting of citizenship only to those who are members of 
the dominant ethnicity of the host nation (Gurowitz, 2015). This presented problems to a 
number of ethnic groups over the course of the twentieth century, most notably Jews and 
later on, Turks. In the case of the Turks, Germany had not anticipated the guest workers’ 
widespread decision to permanently relocate. Thus, we see that their incorporation model 
began to shift more out of necessity than empathy. The segregationist model was marked 
by the unavoidable presence of an assimilationist model in which immigrants are expected 
to disregard or downplay their former identity and adopt the political, social, and cultural 
traits of their new state of residence. A segregationist/assimilationist receiving state such as 
Germany wants to uphold certain ideals of the nation and expects immigrants to conform 
to German traditions and patterns of living. If the immigrants are unable or unwilling to 
conform, they are prevented de facto from joining German society. Therefore, it is gener-
ally easier if the dominant culture of an assimilationist nation is similar to that of the entering 
migrant groups (Gurowitz, 2015). Turkish culture greatly differs from German culture and 
this has led to major integration issues over the past 50 years. 
 Before delving into the details of the social, cultural, and economic organization of 
Turks in Germany, I will provide a short overview of Germany’s citizenship policy. For-
merly, Germany upheld jus sanguinis, a policy that maintained that a person could only 
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hold German citizenship if they were ethnically German. In 1999, Germany modified their 
citizenship laws to “bestow citizenship without proof of German ancestry by the applicant, 
though there are significant bureaucratic rules that individuals must navigate in order to be-
come citizens” (Mueller, 2006, 421). While many Turks wish to maintain dual citizenship, 
Germany does not allow its citizens to hold two passports and forces them to choose by the 
age of 23. While a majority of Turkish Germans decides to keep their EU passports, they 
cling to Turkey through less tangible means, i.e. cultural and ethnic devotion.
 Most of the Turk-Germans and Turks residing in Germany live in ethnic enclaves 
either with or near their extended family. The notoriously high fertility rates of Turkish 
immigrants have helped Germany and other European nations manage their variable de-
mographics and aging populations. The largesse of Turk-German families has also allowed 
these ethnic neighborhoods to flourish, as “the needs of the group and their businesses are 
concerned with preserving both customs and other aspects of the culture in the region of 
origin” (Kesteloot & Mistiaen, 1997, 326). These neighborhoods act as sanctuaries and 
ersatz homes for Turkish immigrants who often find themselves unable to participate in 
Germany’s larger society. Claus Mueller’s 2005 paper “Integrating Turkish Communities: 
a German Dilemma” sharply criticizes Germany’s assimilationist model, arguing that “the 
Turkish minority is becoming part of a ‘parallel society’ reinforced by discrimination, re-
stricted educational achievements, and a low socioeconomic status.” This “parallel society” 
often leaves immigrants and their families feeling isolated, alienated, and lost. Because of 
this, many Turks have turned to the Muslim faith with a renewed fervor, finding support 
through the mosque as well as an opportunity to shed their outsider status. As in many-
countries around the world, a majority of Germans feel that too many foreigners live in the 
country. The lack of a dual citizenship system as well as the push for assimilation by Ger-
man nationals has culminated in a Germany in which Turkish Germans find themselves at a 
systematic disadvantage both economically and socially. The rise of far-right parties touting 
anti-immigration platforms and grassroots movements such as Pegida (Patriotic Europeans 
Against the Islamisation of the West) have cast new fears into the minds of Turkish Germans 
and their allies.
Turkish Immigration the Netherlands
 According to a January 2014 estimate by the Gatestone Institute, Turkish immigrants 
make up six percent of the total population in the Netherlands. The history of Turkish im-
migration flows to the Netherlands resembles that of Germany, with three main “partially 
overlapping” periods (Bolt, 2002, 271).  The labor shortages of the 1960s and '70s warranted 
the entry of guest workers; coupled with family reunification policies, the result was a jump 
in immigration numbers. In the 1980s, family formation, defined as a person immigrating 
to marry a person in the receiving country, also contributed to the increasing numbers of 
Turks in Europe. As Gideon Bolt notes, “from 1989 onwards, family formation exceeded 
family reunification” (Bolt, 2002, pg. 271). 
       A country famous for its tolerant political and social policies, the Netherlands exempli-
fies the multicultural model of incorporation. Under this model, a state promotes the value 
of diversity as a part of the national identity. Cultural pluralism allows for the equal status 
and preservation of all cultures. Over time, documented immigrants receive greater rights 
and even undocumented immigrants are provided with basic rights such as education. In 
1983, the Dutch government made an official statement declaring the Netherlands to be a 
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multicultural society and they created a “two-track” minorities policy “aim[ed] at the inte-
gration as well as the preservation of cultural identity” (Eldering, 1997, 334). 
 The segregationist/assimilationist model of Germany bears a sharp relief against the 
multicultural model of the Netherlands, but one could argue that Dutch citizenship policies 
retain a conservative bent. Turkish immigrants to the Netherlands can apply for citizenship 
but, as in Germany, dual citizenship is not an option. Many Turks choose not to become 
Dutch nationals because they would lose their legal position in Turkey and would be un-
able to own real estate and operate businesses there (Eldering, 1997, 336). In her 1997 paper 
entitled “Ethnic Minority Students in the Netherlands from a Cultural-Ecological Perspec-
tive,” Lotty Eldering details how “the children of foreigners take the nationality of their 
parents” and can choose to become a Dutch national at 18 years of age. The liberal twist lies 
in the fact that foreigners legally residing in the Netherlands “have the same social rights as 
Dutch citizens and they can vote in municipal elections and be elected to municipal councils 
after a legal stay of five years” (Eldering, 1997, 337). The political rights extended to per-
manent residents equate to the rights of citizenship in other countries and offer immigrants 
a valuable opportunity to participate in and shape their communities. 
Turkish Immigration to Belgium
 The 200,000 Turkish immigrants living in Belgium make up six percent of the total 
population. Interestingly, the same percentage of Turkish immigrants live in the Nether-
lands. Even though Belgium placed a moratorium on immigration in 1974, Belgium has one 
of the fastest growing Muslim populations in Europe, with immigrants flowing into Brussels 
and other urban areas (Timmerman, 2003, 1068). Family reunification accounts for a ma-
jority of the entrants while asylees (particularly the Kurds) and undocumented immigrants 
also supply the immigration flow. The citizenship policy of Belgium is jus soli, the Latin 
translation being “right of the soil,” which allows “those who were born in Belgium or who 
arrive here at pre-school age and whose parents or grandparents are of foreign origin…[to 
be] Belgian citizens irrespective of their nationality” (Timmerman, 2003, 1068). Belgium’s 
jus soli policy reveals a liberal perspective within the government, and the nation becomes 
particularly interesting when I identify their model of incorporation. The province of Wal-
lonia, which constitutes the southern half of Belgium, has taken on the segregationist/as-
similationist model of Germany. However, the northern half of Belgium, the province of 
Flanders, has employed many aspects of the multicultural model we see in the Netherlands. 
The integration strategy of Flanders has been vastly more successful than that of Wallonia. 
Turkish immigrants living in Flanders are more likely to graduate from high school and 
earn gainful employment than their counterparts in Wallonia, though substantial wage and 
education gaps persist between the native-generation (second-generation Turks) and their 
non-immigrant counterparts (Baert, 2014, 9). While the segregationist/assimilationist mod-
el isolates and marginalizes minority populations—as we see in the case of Germany—the 
multicultural model encourages immigrants to participate in larger society and interact with 
others outside their ethnic identity while retaining their traditions and core values.
The Big If: Turkish Membership to the European Union
 Over the past few years, the European Union has strategically distanced itself from the 
possibility of mentoring Turkey through the membership process. Turkey’s conservative 
government, headed by Sharia-law advocate Recep Erdoğan has also veered away from the 
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idea of seeking membership. While these actions indicate that membership is not currently 
a viable option, future events could rapidly change the possibility of Turkish EU mem-
bership. The current economic crisis faced by Greece and thus, the European Union as a 
whole, has resulted in a situation in which Greece could default on its debt and be stripped 
of EU membership. If this happens, the European Union will lose strategic presence in the 
southeast Mediterranean region. Russia will rush to Greece’s aid and generate a presence 
on the west side of the Ukraine and in the Middle East. Russia represents a major threat to 
the European Union should Greece fall, and Turkey could be groomed for membership if 
a major shift in power dynamics occurs in that region. 
 If the situation should shift in a manner radical enough to allow for Turkey to join 
the European Union, immigration flows from Turkey to other EU countries would likely 
return to those of guest-worker program era in the 1960s. Shorter residency stints could 
become more popular as traversing between the nations became easier. Infrastructure and 
other economic improvements mandated through the membership process would make 
Turkey more attractive to those who left for the amenities of Western Europe long ago. 
Speculation aside, integration concerns of current EU member countries would be best ad-
dressed through a multicultural incorporation model. Unfortunately, multiculturalism seems 
to be a far cry for many European countries shaken by economic troubles and the rise of 
anti-immigration far-right parties (and the rise of nationalism that often accompanies reces-
sions!). 
Conclusion
 Turkish immigrants have become one of the largest non-EU minority populations in 
Europe and they compose substantial numbers in individual countries such as Germany, 
the Netherlands, and Belgium. The segregationist/assimilationist and multiculturalist mod-
els adopted by these countries have indicated varying levels of success in integration. The 
Netherlands has been relatively successful in their integration attempts due to the imple-
mentation of social and cultural support programs. However, the Dutch political scene has 
seen a rise in the popularity of far-right parties, as have many other countries in Europe. 
While the possibility of Turkey gaining membership to the European Union seems far-
fetched, the idea must still be considered. Turkish membership would create major change 
within the current climate of the EU, much like the addition of ten Eastern European coun-
tries in 2004’s enlargement. To maintain the egalitarian principles of the European Union, 
all ten additions needed to be treated as equals by the nations who were already members. 
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